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Benedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS
(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)
Translated by R. H. M. Elwes
Human infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions I name bondage:for, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is not his own master, butlies at the mercy of fortune: so much so, that he is often compelled,while seeing that which is better for him, to follow that which is worse.Why this is so, and what is good or evil in the emotions, I propose toshow in this part of my treatise. But, before I begin, it would be wellto make a few prefatory observations on perfection and imperfection,good and evil.
When a man has purposed to make a given thing, and has brought itto perfection, his work will be pronounced perfect, not only byhimself, but by everyone who rightly knows, or thinks that he knows,the intention and aim of its author. For instance, suppose anyone sees awork (which I assume to be not yet completed), and knows that the aimof the author of that work is to build a house, he will call the workimperfect; he will, on the other hand, call it perfect, as soon as hesees that it is carried through to the end, which its author had purposedfor it. But if a man sees a work, the like whereof he has never seenbefore, and if he knows not the intention of the artificer, he plainlycannot know, whether that work be perfect or imperfect. Such seems tobe the primary meaning of these terms.
But, after men began to form general ideas, to think out types ofhouses, buildings, towers, &c., and to prefer certain types to others,it came about, that each man called perfect that which he saw agreewith the general idea he had formed of the thing in question, and calledimperfect that which he saw agree less with his own preconceived type,even though it had evidently been completed in accordance with the ideaof its artificer. This seems to be the only reason for calling naturalphenomena, which, indeed, are not made with human hands, perfect orimperfect: for men are wont to form general ideas of things natural, noless than of things artificial, and such ideas they hold as types,believing that Nature (who they think does nothing without an object)has them in view, and has set them as types before herself. Therefore,when they behold something in Nature, which does not wholly conform tothe preconceived type which they have formed of the thing in question,they say that Nature has fallen short or has blundered, and has lefther work incomplete. Thus we see that men are wont to style naturalphenomena perfect or imperfect rather from their own prejudices, thanfrom true knowledge of what they pronounce upon.
Now we showed in the Appendix to Part I., that Nature does not workwith an end in view. For the eternal and infinite Being, which we callGod or Nature, acts by the same necessity as that whereby it exists. Forwe have shown, that by the same necessity of its nature, whereby itexists, it likewise works (I:xvi.). The reason or cause why God or Natureexists, and the reason why he acts, are one and the same. Therefore,as he does not exist for the sake of an end, so neither does he act forthe sake of an end; of his existence and of his action there is neitherorigin nor end. Wherefore, a cause which is called final is nothing elsebut human desire, in so far as it is considered as the origin or causeof anything. For example, when we say that to be inhabited is the finalcause of this or that house, we mean nothing more than that a man,conceiving the convenience