Copyright 1920, by Harper & Brothers
Printed in the United States of America
Published February, 1920
It is almost superfluous to say that this book doesnot claim to be a history, however summary, of the PeaceConference, seeing that such a work was made sheerimpossible now and forever by the chief delegates themselveswhen they decided to dispense with records of theirconversations and debates. It is only a sketch—a sketchof the problems which the war created or rendered pressing—ofthe conditions under which they cropped up;of the simplicist ways in which they were conceived bythe distinguished politicians who volunteered to solvethem; of the delegates' natural limitations and electioneeringcommitments and of the secret influences bywhich they were swayed; of the peoples' needs andexpectations; of the unwonted procedure adopted bythe Conference and of the fateful consequences of itsdecisions to the world.
In dealing with all those matters I aimed at impartiality,which is an unattainable ideal, but I trust thatsincerity and detachment have brought me reasonablyclose to it. Having no pet theories of my own to champion,my principal standard of judgment is derived from thelaw of causality and the rules of historical criticism.
The fatal tactical mistake chargeable to the Conferencelay in its making the charter of the League of Nationsand the treaty of peace with the Central Powers interdependent.For the maxims that underlie the former areirreconcilable with those that should determine the latter,and the efforts to combine them must, among other untowardresults, create a sharp opposition between the vitalinterests of the people of the United States and theapparent or transient interests of their associates. Theoutcome of this unnatural