General Joseph Palafox
From the Portrait by Goya in the Prado Gallery.
Walker & Cockerell Ph. Sc.
BY
CHARLES OMAN, M.A.
FELLOW OF ALL SOULS COLLEGE
AND DEPUTY PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY (CHICHELE)
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE REAL ACADEMIA
DE LA HISTORIA OF MADRID
Vol. II
Jan.-Sept. 1809
FROM THE BATTLE OF CORUNNA
TO THE END OF THE TALAVERA CAMPAIGN
WITH MAPS, PLANS AND ILLUSTRATIONS
OXFORD
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
1903
[p. ii]HENRY FROWDE, M.A.
PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
LONDON, EDINBURGH
NEW YORK
[p. iii]
The second volume of this work has swelled to aneven greater bulk than its predecessor. Its size must be attributed totwo main causes: the first is the fact that a much greater number oforiginal sources, both printed and unprinted, are available for thecampaigns of 1809 than for those of 1808. The second is that the warin its second year had lost the character of comparative unity whichit had possessed in its first. Napoleon, on quitting Spain in January,left behind him as a legacy to his brother a comprehensive plan for theconquest of the whole Peninsula. But that plan was, from the first,impracticable: and when it had miscarried, the fighting in every regionof the theatre of war became local and isolated. Neither the harassedand distracted French King at Madrid, nor the impotent Spanish Junta atSeville, knew how to combine and co-ordinate the operations of theirvarious armies into a single logical scheme. Ere long, six or sevencampaigns were taking place simultaneously in different corners of thePeninsula, each of which was practically independent of the others.Every French and Spanish general fought for his own hand, with littlecare for what his colleagues were doing: their only unanimity was thatall alike kept urging on their central governments the plea that theirown particular section of the war was more critical and important thanany other. If we look at the month of May, 1809, we find that the[p. iv] following six disconnectedseries o